Michigan Law Review
Volume 60

Issue 2

1961

Federal Agency Investigations: Requirements for the Production
of Documents
Frank E. Cooper
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Evidence Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons

Recommended Citation
Frank E. Cooper, Federal Agency Investigations: Requirements for the Production of Documents, 60 MICH.
L. REV. 187 (1961).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

FEDERAL AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS: REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTSt

Frank E. Cooper*
United States district courts are frequently called upon to
decide whether an administrative agency is entitled to enforcement of a subpoena requesting production of documentary
evidence which the person to whom the subpoena is addressed assails as an unnecessary and improper inquisitorial investigation.
In considering such requests for enforcement, the district
courts have little to guide them except (I) the statement found
in section 6 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act that the court
shall sustain the subpoena "to the extent that it is found to be in
accordance with law" ;1 and (2) the declaration of the Court in
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling2 (decided a few months
before enactment of the act) that the three basic tests by which
to determine whether the subpoena is "in accordance with law"
are (a) whether the inquiry is one the demanding agency is
authorized by law to make; (b) whether the materials specified
are relevant to an authorized inquiry; (c) whether the disclosure
sought is unreasonable.
Neither the statute nor the decision-landmarks though they
both are-offers a convenient rule of thumb to guide the district
courts in the intensely difficult problems posed by requests for
enforcement of administrative subpoenas.
However, an examination of the decisions passing upon such
requests does disclose the standards by which the courts apply the
three classic tests, and suggests certain practical guides. This article reports the results of such an examination.

T

HE

t This article is based on the product of a research project conducted by a seminar
group at The University of Michigan Law School. The group undertook to read all
the reported cases decided during the past twelve years dealing with the enforcement
of administrative subpoenas in an attempt to determine the standards by which the
courts decide whether a subpoena is in accordance with law. Members of the seminar
were Ceferino Gaddi, Edward Keller, Robert Margolin, David Reed, Dean Shipman, Marvin Vvilenzik, and Morton Zedd; Denis Rice was director of research
for the group.-Ed.
• Of the Detroit Bar; Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (c) (1958).
!l 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
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The prevailing interpretation of the three basic tests suggested in the Oklahoma Press case will be first discussed; thereafter a brief analysis will be made of the seven subsidiary principles most often urged in the application of the three basic tests.

I. INTERPRETATION OF THE THREE BASIC TESTS
A. Defense That Issuance of Subpoena Is Not Authorized
by Statute
It is commonplace that an agency does not have power to issue
a subpoena except as authorized by statute. This is established
both by case law and by the provisions of the APA. 8
As the Court phrased it in Oklahoma Press, the initial question is whether "the inquiry is one the demanding agency is
authorized by law to make." 4 In other words, when enforcement
of an administrative subpoena is resisted, the court first looks
to the statute creating the agency to determine whether it authorizes the issuance of the subpoena.
In making this determination, the task of the court is not the
barren legalistic one of rhetorical construction of the statutory
provision. The courts do not make a fortress of the dictionary,
nor deem their task one which can be accomplished by dispassionate, disinterested construction of the language found in the statute. Rather, they consider the consequences of alternate constructions.
Thus, where the agency is authorized to compel by subpoena
the appearance of witnesses, it is held in immigration cases that
the person against whom the agency is proceeding is not a witness,
but in Federal Trade Commission cases such person is a witness/'
Why does the word witness have a broader meaning in one
statute than in the other? In the immigration case, the Court
said that a restrictive reading of the "Janus-faced word 'witness'"
was proper in view of the circumstance that the power to issue
subpoenas was not restricted to the heads of the agency but was
delegated to "any immigration officer"; and the subpoena power
3 See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357 (1942), and 60 Stat. 240 (1946),
5 U .S.C. § 1005 (b) , (c) (1958) .
4 327 U.S. at 208.
5 Compare United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179 (1956)
(immigration) with FI'C
v. Scientific Living, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 495 (D. Pa. 1957) •
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"is a power capable of oppressive use, especially when it may be
indiscriminately delegated and the subpoena is not returnable
before a judicial officer." 11a The Court apparently believed that
grave mischief might result if the term "witness" were given its
natural reading as meaning any person subpoenaed to testify.
In Federal Trade Commission cases, on the other hand, where
there is less fear of the consequences of oppressive use of the
subpoena power, the word "witness" is read as including respondents as well as anyone else.
The ability of the Court to read statutory language restrictively,
as illustrated by the immigration case, is paralleled by its ability
to read statutory language expansively, where to do so is deemed
to accomplish a desirable result. Such expansive reading is illustrated in FTC v. Tuttle 6 and FTC v. Bowman.7 Both cases involved
the same question. The FTC was authorized by statute "to copy
any documentary evidence of any corporation being investigated
... [and] to require by subpoena ... the production of all such
documentary evidence... .'' 8 Did this authorize the Commission
to require the production of documentary evidence of a corporation not being investigated-or did the phrase "such documentary
evidence" indicate that the right to subpoena was no broader
than the right to copy, i.e., that in eiili;er case the power could
be exercised only with respect to a corporation being investigated?
This latter restrictive construction would seem to be justified
(if not required, as eloquently argued by Judge Medina in his
dissent in the Tuttle case) by the plain language of the statute.
But both courts facing this question found that the public need
for broad investigatory powers justified the expansive reading
for which the Commission contended.
These two cases illustrate the great change which has occurred
during the past thirty-five years in the willingness of courts to
adopt a liberal construction of statutory language, where it is felt
that such construction is socially desirable. 9
l!a United States v. Minker, supra note 5, at 187, quoting Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 363 (1941).
6 244 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1957).
7 248 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1957) •
s Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1958).
(Emphasis added.)
9 In FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924), the Court held that the
Commission's power to examine documentary evidence did not include the power to
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But the trend is not exclusively in the direction of so-called
liberal interpretation. In United States v. O'Connor,10 the court
ruled that the Internal Revenue Service was not authorized to
utilize its power to issue subpoenas for the purpose of obtaining
information to help the Justice Department prosecute a criminal
case. This, said the court, would be a perversion of statutory
powers.
Other cases decided since the enactment of the Administrative
Procedure Act support the conclusion suggested by the cases discussed above: the statutory language authorizing agencies to issue
subpoenas is typically cast in terms broad enough to be capable
of being characterized as "ambiguous" whenever the court finds
there is a need for interpretation.11 Such words as "witness," and
"evidence," relevant to a "matter" within the "jurisdiction" of the
agency, all afford a wide area for judicial interpretation-either
for a broad and expansive interpretation which results in almost
unlimited power to issue subpoenas, or in tight restrictive definition which greatly limits the subpoena power. The same courts
which at times engage in broad interpretation, on other occasions
engage in restrictive interpretation, apparently being influenced
by their judgment as to the social desirability of empowering a
particular agency to obtain a certain type of information under
the stated circumstances.
B.

Defense of Irrelevancy

It is impossible to reconcile the many decisions passing upon
the defense that the subpoena should not be enforced because
of the asserted irrelevancy of the material sought. Nor is it posexamine the documents of the very corporation being investigated unless the Commission could show that those documents contained information that would be relevant
to the Commission's charge (because unless they contained relevant information they
would not be "evidence") . There, the construction was so strict as almost to choke
off the Commission's powers of investigation. Now the pendulum has swung far in
the opposite direction, and the Commission may examine documents of companies
not under investigation, in the hope they might turn up something relevant to a
company that is under investigation.
118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953).
See United States v. Zuskar, 237 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1956); Sale v. United States,
228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1956); General Trades School v. United States, 212 F.2d 656
(8th Cir. 1954); Carroll Vocational Institute v. United States, 211 F.2d 539 (5th Cir.
1954).
10
11
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sible to derive from them any convenient horn-book rule. The
fundamental reason for the difficulty faced by the courts when
the question of relevancy is raised arises from the fact that the
court is asked to determine the relevancy of unknown documents
to unspecified issues-a rather difficult feat for even the most
agile judges. The agency has not seen the documents it is demanding; not knowing what the documents might reveal, it is
difficult for counsel for the agency to establish their relevancy.
Counsel for respondent has a slightly different problem. He knows
the contents of the documents, to be sure, but he does not wish
to reveal them; and it is a bit difficult to establish the irrelevancy
of a document whose contents one does not wish to disclose. Further, when the issue of relevancy is argued, the actual issues involved in the administrative proceeding may not yet have been
crystallized.
Faced with this practical difficulty, the courts are inclined to\,say that the agency has discharged whatever initial burden may ·
be imposed on it as moving party, if it accompanies the application with an affidavit setting forth such information as may be
presently available to it indicating why it believes the subpoenaed \
material will be of material aid to the agency. It is important that
the agency make such a showing. Many judges exhibit a much \;
less hospitable attitude when an agency demands enforcement
of a subpoena without thus explaining its need for the information. If the court feels it is being asked to rubber-stamp the
agency's subpoenas, an attitude of judicial resentment frequently
appears. 12
There can be found in the cases strong and explicit statements
that relevancy must be shown before the subpoena will be enforced.13 However, most courts rule that if the agency has made
an initial showing that the desired information may be "reasonably
relevant," 14 the burden shifts to the respondent to "disprove" its
12 See, e.g., Chapman v. Maren Elwood College, 225
13 Thus, in Hermann v. CAB, 237 F.2d 359, 362

F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1955).
(9th Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S.
322 (1957) , the court said: "In order to have the subpoena enforced, the issue as to
whether each of the documents subpoenaed is relevant and material is a judicial ques•
tion which must be passed on by the courts." The same court, in Hubner v. Tucker,
245 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1957), said that a lack of specification of particular documents
precluded a showing that any one of the documents was relevant, and that accordingly
an IRS subpoena would not be enforced.
14 FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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relevancy,1 5 and the courts are generally inclined to overrule a
defense of irrelevancy unless the party resisting the subpoena
makes it appear plainly to the court that the documents in question
are "palpably irrelevant" or "plainly incompetent,"16 or that they
have "no potential relevancy." The phrases vary, but the general
effect is that a heavy burden of persuasion is placed on defendant
if he is to convince the court that production of the material
should be denied for reasons of irrelevancy alone.17
Of course, it is a rare case where the defense of irrelevancy
is raised alone. Almost every case which involves the demanded
production of allegedly irrelevant documents also involves demands which the defendant conceives to be unduly burdensome.
In deciding cases, the district judges exhibit a tendency to consider "irrelevancy" as a sort of secondary defense. If the court
feels that the subpoena as a whole imposes an unconscionable
burden upon defendant, and that enforcement would not be in
the public interest, it is likely to throw in as an additional reason
for denying enforcement the statement that the documents appear
to be largely irrelevant.18
In the end, it would seem that enforcement of the subpoena
is not likely to be denied on grounds of irrelevancy unless defendant makes a strong showing that the documents are obviously
; irrelevant, and further that their production would cause so sub• stantial a burden that enforcement of the request would involve
i an unreasonable interference with protected rights of privacy.

l

C. Defense of Undue Burden
The Supreme Court in the Oklahoma Press case did not define
the "unreasonable disclosure" that is proscribed as being oppressive and unduly burdensome. However, applications of this test
by the lower courts indicate that the mere circumstance that
Shaughnessy v. Bacolas, 135 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
Jackson Packing Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1953).
17 See Kilgore Nat'l Bank v. Federal Petroleum Bd., 209 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1954).
18 Conversely, where the demand appears on the whole to be fair and proper,
the courts may require submission of a specified group of records (e.g., time records
of all employees) even•though some of them are concededly irrelevant, on the eminently
practical ground that the easiest way to separate the relevant from the irrelevant is to
let the agency sort them out. See McComb v. Hunsaker Trucking Contractor, Inc.,
171 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1948).
15

16
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compliance with the requirements of the subpoena will be expensive and will interfere with the conduct of respondent's business
does not in itself often afford a basis for refusal to enforce the subpoena. Rather, the courts take into consideration the character
of the administrative investigation, the apparent importance to
the agency of the documents in question (i.e., their potential
relevancy), and the purpose of the agency in issuing the subpoena.
A succinct phrase of Judge Hutcheson in Winn & Lovett
Grocery v. NLRB 19 suggests the attitude which apparently is characteristic of the district courts and courts of appeals in considering
contentions that a subpoena is unduly burdensome. He suggests
that if it appears to the court on the whole record that the purpose
of the subpoena is to "annoy and embarrass" rather than to "discover and reveal," the court may deny enforcement.
Usually something more than inconvenience is involved where
the court finds the disclosure demanded "unreasonable," and the
requirements of the subpoena therefore unduly burdensome. It
is noteworthy that in most of the cases where a court has relied on
the undue burden imposed by a subpoena in declining application for enforcement, there is a strong suggestion that the subpoena was issued for improper purposes.20
The considerations that sway the court were well stated in
FCC v. Cohn,21 where the court spoke of the "necessity for drawing
lines between the protection of the public interest . . . and the
19 213 F.2d 785, 786 (5th Cir. 1954) •
20 Thus, enforcement has been denied

where: (1) a subpoena requiring production of
service certificates of seamen was apparently utilized as an indirect means of effecting
a temporary suspension of their licenses, pending a hearing-a suspension which the
agency was without authority to accomplish by direct order. In re Merchant Mariners
Documents Issued to Dimitatos, 91 F. Supp. 426 (N.D. Cal. 1949); (2) a subpoena was
issued after the respondent had refused to accept what the court described as a
"penalty arbitrarily fixed" by representatives of the agency, who then issued the subpoena apparently with the purpose of exerting pressure upon respondent to accept
the proposed penalty. Chapman v. Maren Elwood College, 225 F.2d 230, 233 (9th Cir.
1955) ; (3) a subpoena requiring a large number of companies to produce their records
at a distance far removed from their offices was issued not in connection with any
scheduled hearing, but apparently for the convenience of an agency attorney who in
preparing for a contemplated hearing thought it would be more convenient to him
to have all the witnesses (not parties to the case) bring their records to his offices,
rather than following the customary course of traveling to the offices of the prospective witnesses and seeing what relevant evidence their records might disclose. NLRB v.
Pesante, 119 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
21 154 F. Supp. 899, 904. (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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rights of individual businessmen to pursue their legitimate business activities without being subjected to unnecessary and harassing governmental inquisition." The court declared, "There are
many instances where the drawing of such lines might exclude
agencies of the Government from pursuing inquiries into purely
private business affairs, absent sufficiently broad or sufficiently defined grant of power by Congress concerning subject matter within the realm of the public interest." In enforcing the subpoena
(with some limitations) the court concluded that while the production of the materials subpoenaed "would place a considerable
burden upon the respondents, I do not feel that such burden is
so great as to be unreasonable and oppressive in the light of the
purposes to be served by the ... investigation." 22
The courts exhibit diligence in discovering practical means to
modify the command of the subpoena, where literal compliance
would be unnecessarily burdensome. Among the devices employed
toward this end are (1) requirements that the agency take steps
to avoid public disclosure of trade secrets revealed to it,23 (2) provisions for examination of the documents by agency representatives
at respondent's place of business,24 and (3) provisions for production of the documents over a period of time, so that respondent
will not be deprived of all his records at once.25
While there are dicta in a few cases that inconvenience to
respondent is never in itself enough to make the demand unduly
oppressive,26 it appears that if the inconvenience is truly burdensome, the courts will take this into account by requiring the wit22 Id. at 912. The balancing of the perennially competing public and private interests is nicely demonstrated in cases involving demands by revenue agents for re•
examination of tax records concerning years that have been previously examined, or
years that are "closed" by the statute, in absence of fraud. As the factual complexion
of cases in this area is altered by particular factors, so the results obtained vary. See
O'Connor v. O'Connell, 253 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1958); Application of United States
(In re Carroll), 246 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1957), and cases cited therein.
23 See FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) , in which the court authorized, in lieu of production of documents, a statement signed by a responsible officer of
the company whose records were subpoenaed, setting forth the information which
would be shown by all the documents. See also Winn 8: Lovett Grocery Co. v. NLRB,
213 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1954) ("in lieu" proviso suggested by the agency).
24 See CAB v. Hermann, 353 U.S. 322 (1957).
25 Ibid.
26 See, e.g., Westside Ford v. United States, 206 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Applica•
tion of Compton, 101 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Tex. 1951).
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ness to produce only such information as is necessary to the attainment of the proper objectives of the agency.
Where the person subpoenaed is not involved in the administrative proceedings except as a witness, the courts are more likely
to attach importance to a plea that the demands of the subpoena
are unduly burdensome. Thus, in two cases enforcement has been
denied to subpoenas which would have required banks to undertake a prodigious search of all their records to discover whether
certain individuals under investigation by the Internal Revenue
Service had purchased bank credits.27
II.

SEVEN SUBSIDIARY PRINCIPLES

A. Defense That Agency Does Not Have Jurisdiction Over
Respondent
It is a troublesome and unsettled question whether, in a case
where an agency asserts jurisdiction, the Court should, before enforcing the agency's subpoena, make an independent inquiry as to
whether the agency does in fact possess the asserted jurisdiction.28
The lower federal courts for years had believed it proper to
make at least a preliminary investigation of the alleged lack of
agency jurisdiction to issue a subpoena.29 Typical of the trend of
decisions are the two which provided the setting for the precedentmaking determination in the Oklahoma Press case.30 In both cases,
the Wage and Hour Division had sought production of records
in connection with investigations under the wage-hour law. The
Courts of Appeals for the Third and Tenth Circuits, respectively,
enforced the subpoenas-the Third on the basis that the agency
had shown reasonable grounds for making the investigation, and
the Tenth on the grounds that the agency had shown probable
21 First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947); United States
ex rel. Sathre v. Third N.W. Nat'l Bank, 102 F. Supp. 879 (D. Minn. 1955) •
28 The question appears not to have been considered by the Supreme Court prior
to Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943). That decision did not dispose of the problem. It appeared to be limited principally to cases involving government contractors and, indeed, it was far from clear that any actual question of lack
of jurisdiction was involved.
29 See cases collected in Note, 56 YALE L.J. 165 (1946).
so The Court combined for decision Walling v. News Printing Co., 148 F.2d 57
(3d Cir. 1945) and Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 147 F.2d 658 (10th Cir.
1945).
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cause. 31 On appeal, these two cases were consulted and the Supreme Court indicated that the applications for enforcement
should have been granted without examination of these jurisdictional questions, and strongly hinted that the issue of lack of
jurisdiction could not be raised as a defense on application for
enforcement of a subpoena, that being a question to be determined,
at least in the first instance, by the agency itself. 32
The continued adherence to this decision has been widely
criticized as in effect nullifying the explicit provision of the Administrative Procedure Act that an agency subpoena should be
enforced only if it is found to be "in accordance with law," for it
would seem that an agency should not be permitted to examine
the affairs of respondents over whom it lacks jurisdiction,33 nevertheless it appears that the rule of the Oklahoma Press case has survived the act.
The Fifth Circuit has specifically declared that the Administrative Procedure Act has not modified the rule of the Oklahoma
Press case.34 The Ninth Circuit found authority in the act to
deny enforcement of an FTC subpoena which called for a mass
of material, at least part of which was thought to relate to matters
clearly beyond the Commission's jurisdiction.35 But this decision
31 Walling v. News Printing Co., supra note 30, at 60; Oklahoma Press Publishing
Co. v. Walling, supra note 30, at 662.
32 327 U.S. at 214.
33 The Oklahoma Press case was decided in February 1946, three months before the
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act, and the decision apparently was not
considered by Congress in adopting that statute. As one commentator put it, although
the draftsmen of the act undoubtedly felt that private parties should be allowed to
raise the defense of lack of agency jurisdiction in a subpoena enforcement proceeding,
they did not include an express provision to that effect because they deemed it un•
necessary. Schwartz, The Administrative Procedure Act in Operation, 29 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev.
1173 (1954) •
The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act is not clear on this
point. While the Senate Judiciary Committee Report and the floor explanation de•
livered by the chairman of the House Subcommittee indicate a purpose to require
some judicial scrutiny of the agency's jurisdiction, they conflict as to the scope of
this authority. The Senate Report indicated it would be enough if the court were
satisfied that the agency could possibly find that it had jurisdiction. S. REP. No. 752,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1945) • The House Report indicated that the phrase "in
accordance with law" meant that the subpoena should be enforced only if the facts
demonstrated that the persons and subject matter to which the subpoena was directed
were within the jurisdiction of the agency. H. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33
(1946).
34 Tobin v. Banks &: Rumbaugh, 201 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1953); D. G. Bland Lumber
Co. v. NLRB, 177 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1949).
35 FTC v. Crafts, 244 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1957) •
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was reversed by the Supreme Court in a one-sentence per curiam
opinion, 36 citing Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins37 and Oklahoma Press.
Unfortunately, it is not clear just what the Oklahoma Press
case stands for. It seemingly does not prevent a court from denying enforcement of a subpoena if it appears clear that the respondent is not subject to the agency's jurisdiction. But if the
issue is doubtful, most of the courts feel obliged to enforce the
subpoena.
Apparently the only relief from the uncertain and unsatisfactory state of affairs now existing in this area is by legislative enactment. The Hoover Commission Task Force on Legal Services
and Procedure concluded that the jurisdictional question should
be considered by the courts in proceedings to enforce subpoenas,
to a limited extent, viz.: "The court shall quash the subpoena ...
to the extent that it finds the same ... beyond the probable jurisdiction of the agency.... " 38

Fishing Expeditions
When one goes fishing, he casts about in all directions as far
as he can; he probes the bottom with sinker and hook; and he may
indeed utilize a net to sieve the entire contents of a lake. Whether
federal agencies may utilize such tactics in their search for information would seem to depend, in the present state of the law,
upon the breadth of the investigatory power delegated to the
agency by the governing statute.
No longer can the mere characterization of the agency's activity as a "fishing expedition" serve to brand the search as illegal.
The philosophy of an earlier day, which held unconstitutional any
"roving inquisitorial investigation"39 has been displaced by an
attitude which led the Court in United States v. Morton Salt Co.40
to declare that the mere fact that "courts could not go fishing"
does not mean that administrative agencies must be deprived of
B.

36

FTC v. Crafts, 355 U.S. 9 (1957).

37 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
38 Proposed Administrative Code § 204 (b)' COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, Legal Services and Procedure, A Report to the
Congress 368 (1955) •
39 See Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936); Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407 (1908).
40 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
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the pleasure. Indeed, said the Court in the same case, even if the
agency's request were regarded "as caused by nothing more than
official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest." Rather the test is,
the Court continued, that "the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable. " 41
In determining the reasonableness of the disclosure, the courts
consider a number of factors. 42 In the Morton Salt case, it seems
probable that the Court was influenced by the fact that the Commission wanted to learn whether respondent was in compliance
with the requirements of an order previously entered against it.
It may be doubted whether so broad an inquiry would have been
sustained if addressed to one who had not previously been found
to have been engaged in illegal trade practices. Similarly, it may
be doubted whether, if an agency undertook on its own initiative
a general investigation to obtain all the information it could as to
the business practices of television stations and those doing business with them,43 it would be permitted to make so broad an inquiry as that permitted in the cited case, where the investigation
had been specifically authorized by Congress.
It is suggested that there is no longer any doctrine which
prohibits "fishing expeditions" as such. Rather, where an agency
is proceeding to drag the nets of inquiry, in the hope that a tasty
fish may be caught, the court will test the legality of the demand
in terms of statutory authorization, the potential relevancy and
significance of the information sought, and the degree of burden
imposed on the respondents. In other words, the courts consider the same factors that are balanced whenever application for
enforcement of a subpoena is resisted.
As a matter of policy, there is room for debate. There have
been indications both from Congress and from unofficial organ41
42

Id. at 652-53.

Thus, if a price control agency is authorized by statute to examine all the
records of a seller to determine whether price ceilings have been exceeded, a broad
scope of inquiry will be permitted. Wockner v. United States, 211 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.
1954) • Also if Congress has by resolution requ_ested an agency to obtain all the information it can relating to a particular topic of congressional inquiry, a far-reaching
search is deemed reasonable. FTC v. National Biscuit Co., 18 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y.
1937).
43 Cf. FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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izations that it would be better on the whole if such broad inquiries were discouraged. In the committee report which accompanied the Administrative Procedure Act, it was said that
section 6 (b) oI the act was "designed to preclude 'fishing expeditions' " and it was asserted that "investigations may not disturb
or disrupt personal privacy, or unreasonably interfere with private
occupation or enterprise." 44 In similar language, the Hoover Commission Task Force on Legal Services and Procedure urged that
"fishing expeditions" should not be permitted which unduly "impinge on the rights of the citizen." 45 _ Such considerations of policy
are fundamentally the responsibility of legislative bodies, in defining the scope of inquiry permitted.

C. Specific Description of Documents Sought
The contentions urged in an earlier day that each particular
document sought must be individually described-in terms, for
example, of a letter of a certain date from a named writer to a
named addressee-have long since gone by the board.
As the court observed in one recent case, it is enough if the
documents are described as accurately as possible under the circumstances.46 Thus, a demand for "all records relating to your
said business for the year 1952,"47 or a demand for "records . . .
relative to all sales of ... automobiles," 48 is considered to contain
a sufficiently specific description of the documents sought.
However, in any case where it is thought that the description
is so vague as to cause real difficulty, courts feel free to modify the
subpoena by incorporating in the court order requiring production a more specific description of the documents to be produced. 49

D. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The same general tests that apply where the privilege of the
fifth amendment is invoked in the course of oral testimony also
« H. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1946) •
45 COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT,

Legal Services and Procedure, A Report to the Congress 60 (1955) •
46 Menzies v. ITC, 242 F.2d 81 (4th Cir. 1957).
47 United States v. Woerth, 130 F. Supp. 930, 934 (N.D. Iowa 1955).
48 Wockner v. United States, 2ll F.2d 490, 492 (9th Cir. 1954).
40 General Trades School, Inc. v. United States, 212 F.2d 656 (8th Cir. 1954) ;
Wagman v. Arnold, 152 F. Supp. 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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apply where a subpoena requiring production of documents is
resisted on the grounds that the production of the documents
would tend to incriminate the witness. 50
There are, however, two particularly troublesome-and completely unsolved-problems that arise in connection with subpoenas duces tecum.
First is the problem of invoking the privilege as a basis for
refusing production of any single part of a large mass of documents. For example, if a subpoena calls for production of all
cancelled checks from the personal checking account of a witness
for a three-year period-or production of all letters exchanged
with named correspondents over a lengthy period-may the witness refuse to produce any evidence at all? Or should it be said
that the privilege is prematurely claimed if urged in blanket
form at the outset, and that the witness must appear with the
subpoenaed documents and raise the claim of privilege only as
to particular documents when examination of such particular
documents is requested?
Either approach encompasses administrative difficulties. If
the witness is permitted to assert the claim in blanket fashion, it
would be put within the power of the witness to foreclose examination of documents which perhaps had no possible tendency
to incriminate him. On the other hand, if he is restricted to the
assertion of the privilege only as to specifically described individual
documents, there is a danger that the very identification of the
document, coupled with a statement of his reasons for refusing
to produce it, might itself lead to incrimination. The problem is
one that the courts have tried to meet, in a practical fashion, on
the facts of the particular case. 51
Perhaps the best solution of the problem is to avoid it by
framing requests for production of documents in specific terms,
50 Such tests may be summarized by saying that the court can refuse to allow the
invocation of the privilege only if it is clear that no possible answer to the question
(and, possibly, anticipated follow-up questions) could tend either to incriminate the
witness or to furnish any link in a chain of testimony that might convict him of
crime. See Justice Marshall's oft-cited statement in United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas.
38, 40 (No. 14692e) (C.C.D. Va. 1807) : "Many links frequently compose that chain of
testimony which is necessary to convict any individual of a crime. It appears to the
court to be the true sense of the rule that no witness is compellable to furnish any one
of them against himself.'' See also Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955).
51 See Hubner v. Tucker, 245 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1957); Shaughnessy v. Bacolas, 135
F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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rather than to rely on broad, all-inclusive demands. If the particular categories of documents which the agency requests are
specifically described, the court can more readily see whether there
is a possibility that all documents falling within the class described
might have a tendency to incriminate.
Even more troublesome is the doctrine of Shapiro v. United
States, 52 that records which one is required by law to keep become
ipso facto public records, and that the privilege does not apply to
public records. Despite the eloquent expostulation in the three
dissenting opinions in the Shapiro case of the dangers which would
result if this doctrine were applied without limitation, the lower
courts have exhibited some tendency to apply it in axiomatic
fashion to refuse to permit a witness to assert the privilege with
respect to any type of record which he is required by administrative regulation to keep. 53
There must be limits to this doctrine; surely the courts would
not sustain a scheme requiring all residents of the United States
to keep a diary of all their acts, and providing for the production
of the diary upon subpoena. The limits are described, it is believed, in the majority opinion in the Shapiro case,54 where it is
suggested that the initial question must always be whether the
government can constitutionally require the keeping of the particular record. If by regulation an agency undertook to require
the keeping of records reporting criminal acts, or to require the
keeping of records so voluminous and involving such deprivation
of well-established rights of personal privacy as to constitute the
very requirement of keeping of the records an unreasonable
search, it would be said that the keeping of such a record could
not constitutionally be required, and that the doctrine of the
Shapiro case would be inapplicable. It is perhaps significant that
the doctrine has been applied principally, if not solely, in connection with records of wages paid, hours worked, imports of
foreign goods, and the prices at which goods were sold-all areas
in which there can be little question as to the reasonableness of
a record-keeping requirement.
335 U.S. I (1948) .
See Wockner v. United States, 211 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1954); Wagman v. Arnold,
152 F. Supp. 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Jones, 72 F. Supp. 48 (S.D Miss. 1947).
54 335 U.S. at 32.
52

53
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Privileged Communications

In principle, evidence which is privileged in civil proceedings
in the courts should also be privileged in proceedings before
administrative agencies. 55 Where the question is raised in connection with the taking of testimony in adversary adjudicatory
proceedings before an agency, the claim of privilege has been
recognized. 56
Is the situation different where disclosure is demanded in the
course of non-adversary investigatory proceedings by an agency?
Considering the reasons which underlie the doctrine of privilege,u7
it would seem that the rule should be the same in adversary and
non-adversary proceedings; and a number of courts have recited
their willingness to "assume ... that the conduct of investigations
[by administrative agencies] ... is subject to the same testimonial
privileges as judicial proceedings." 58
Further support for the conclusion that rules of privilege
should apply in investigatory proceeding of agencies is found in
Rule 81 (a) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically providing for the applicability of the rules to proceedings
to compel compliance with administrative subpoenas. Since the
federal rules do apply, and since they recognize the testimonial
privileges,59 it would seem that enforcement of administrative
subpoenas should be made subject to the condition that privileged
testimony would ·not be disclosed. But, despite all this, a trend
may be observed in recent decisions to restrict these privileges
55 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2300 (a) (McNaughton rev. 1961). It is suggested that the
attorney-client privilege should apply even with respect to disclosures to non-attorneys
who are licensed to practice before a particular agency, where the regulations treat the
persons appearing before it as having the responsibilities of attorneys and being subject
to professional discipline.
56 Baldwin v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1942).
57 See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
58 The language is that of Learned Hand in McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378
(2d Cir. 1937) ; it has been quoted and approved in In re Albert Lindley Lee Mem.
Hospital, 209 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1953), and in Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d
734, 737 (5th Cir. 1953). The opinion in United States v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 236 U.S.
318 (1915) , appears strongly to support this view, as does City Council v. Goldwater,
284 N.Y. 296, 31 N.E.2d 31 (1940). The decision in SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226
(D.D.C. 1948) , specifically applied the privilege to excuse the production in an investigation by the SEC into matters protected by the attorney-client privilege.
li9 FED. R. CIV. P. 43 (a).
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to narrow limits in cases where the public need for information
is great. 60

F. Delegations of Authority
Occasionally, administrative subpoenas are resisted on the
basis that the person acting for the agency in the matter has no
authority to act. While such defenses have in a number of cases
been sustained in the lower courts (perhaps for the reason that
the court felt the request for information was, under all the circumstances, unfair, and wished to have a convenient legal point
upon which to base its refusal to enforce the subpoena) the strong
trend of appellate decisions is to overrule such defenses. 61
Indeed, the agencies have been successful in avoiding the
question as to the validity of subpoenas issued by agency employees, through the simple expedient of having the agency heads
sign subpoenas in blank, which are then supplied to staff assistants
for use at their convenience as the occasion arises. This practice
appears to have been uniformly upheld on the theory that even
though the administrator cannot delegate the power to sign the
subpoena, he may sign the document in blank, permitting his
assistants to fill it out. 62
In several NLRB cases, a question arose whether the power to
revoke subpoenas could be delegated to trial examiners. The
60 Sec In re Albert Lindley Lee Mem. Hospital, 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953) . Indeed, language in these two cases
suggests a possibility that some courts would be willing to permit an agency to obtain
by subpoena privileged information, were the public need sufficiently impelling,
on the theory that since agencies are not bound to observe the common law exclusionary rules of evidence, they should also be free to disregard the rules as to
privileged communications. It seems more likely, however, that the courts will undertake the accommodation of competing policies by restrictive interpretations of the scope
of the asserted privilege.
61 In the early 1940's, the decision in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357
(1942) , was generally considered to stand for tl1e proposition that the power to issue
subpoenas could not be delegated by agency heads to staff assistants, unless the statute
provided for such delegation. This case has been limited, however, on the basis that
the result in that case must be explained on the particular legislative history of the
enactment there involved. The attitude of the courts now appears to be that the
power to delegate issuance of subpoenas should be sustained unless the statute plainly
or by necessary implication prohibits such delegation. See Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111 (1947); NLRB v. Lewis, 249 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1957),
aff'd, 357 U.S. 10 (1958); NLRB v. John S. Barnes Corp., 178 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1949).
62 See NLRB v. Lewis, supra note 61; Jackson Packing Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 842
(5th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Pesante, 119 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
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language of the act was clearly susceptible to a construction that
this power could not be delegated, and some of the lower courts
so held. 63 But it is now established that this delegation is permitted. 64
Whether a staff attorney is a "party" entitled to obtain issuance of a subpoena was doubted in some of the early cases. 65
But later cases find no difficulty in sustaining the right of a staff
attorney to obtain issuance of a subpoena in a matter with which
he is officially concerned. 66
The attitude of the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court
appears to be that so long as respondent has the protection afforded by his right to demand that a district judge pass upon
the reasonableness of the demand for information, 67 no harm is
done in permitting delegation to staff assistants of power to take
action with reference to the issuance, revocation, and applications
for enforcement of subpoenas. Indeed, it is suggested that because of their greater familiarity with the details of the cases involved, these staff assistants are in a much better position than are
their superior officers to exercise intelligent discretion on the
appropriateness of the requested demand.

G.

"Unnecessary Examinations"

The Internal Revenue Code, in providing that no taxpayer
shall be subjected to "unnecessary examination," 68 imposes a restriction on the Internal Revenue Service to which most other
agencies are not subject.
63 NLRB v. Duval Jewelry Co., 243 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 857 U.S. l
(1958) ; NLRB v. Pesante, supra note 62.
64 In Duval Jewelry Co. v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 1 (1958), the result was reached on the
basis that there was only a partial delegation of authority, with the Board itself retaining supervisory power. In NLRB v. International Typographical Union, 76 F. Supp.
895 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), Judge Medina reached the same result on the theory that such
delegation was permitted by the APA. Other courts have reached the same result on
the apparent theory that the labor law did not prohibit such delegation. See NLRB v.
Lewis, 249 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1957), afj'd, 357 U.S. 10 (1958) ; NLRB v. Gunaca, 135
F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Wis. 1955) , afj'd, 230 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1956) .
65 See, e.g., NLRB v. Pesante, 119 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. Cal. 1954) •
66 See NLRB v. Lewis, 249 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1957), afj'd, 357 U.S. 10 (1958); NLRB
v. Duval Jewelry Co., 243 F.2d 427 (5th Cir.. 1957), rev'd, 357 U.S. 1 (1958) •
67 This would seem to be the key of the matter. See concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Jackson in Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking 8: Lumber Co., 331 U.S. Ill, 123
(1947).
68 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7605.
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The cases applying this provision draw a distinction between
cases where the investigation is directed to the taxpayer himself
and cases where the investigation is directed to a third party. 69
In the former case, the statutory caveat has had little effect in
reducing the agency's discovery powers. In such cases the phrase
is construed as designed only to prevent uselessly repetitive procedures and investigations not relevant to any possible tax liability. 70
However, where the subpoena is directed to a third party
whose tax liability is not involved but who is in possession of
records which may have a bearing on the tax liability of the taxpayer whose liability is under investigation, the courts have frequently refused to enforce the administrative demand on the
theory that the investigation has not been shown to be necessary.71
In such cases, the statutory caveat against "unnecessary examinations" was apparently relied on as a basis for refusing to enforce
subpoenas which the court deemed unreasonably broad under the
circumstances.

III. A SUGGESTED CURE FOR THE CURRENT CONFUSION
Only two conclusions can safely be derived from an examination of the decisions of the lower federal courts applying the tests
of the Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. case.72 They are: (I) the
tests are imprecise; (2) their application lacks consistency. This
result is unfortunate both from the viewpoint of the agencies and
from that of respondents.
There is a need, surely, for legislation. Even though the questions involved may be of such a nature as to defy the ingenuity
of draftsmen to phrase a statutory standard that will be capable
of precise and equitable application in all the varied instances in
which the question of enforcing a subpoena may arise, at least it
would be possible to lay down a few fundamental guides.
Both the Hoover Commission Task Force on Legal Services
69 E.g., Application of Levine, 149 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 243
F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1956) .
70 See United States v. Carroll, 246 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1957).
71 See Local 174, Teamsters Union v. United States, 240 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1956);
First Nat'! Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947) ; United States ex rel.
Sathre v. Third N.W. Nat'! Bank, 102 F. Supp. 879 (D. Minn. 1952) .
72 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
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and Procedure and the American Bar Association drafting committee have recognized the need for procedural provisions which
would clear up a part of the existing uncertainty by providing
that any person subjected to an agency subpoena may, before
compliance and upon timely petition, obtain from a federal district court a ruling as to its lawfulness; and requiring the court
to quash the subpoena if it is found to be unreasonable in terms,
irrelevant in scope, or beyond the jurisdiction of the agency.
Such procedural provisions would be most helpful. But there
is a need for something more-for some enunciation of basic
policy that will serve as a touchstone in the application of the
0 klahoma Press tests. Such a need might in substantial measure
be met by legislation which applied to all federal agencies a
limitation (derived from the provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code) that subpoenas should be enforceable only where the disclosure sought was demonstrably necessary.

